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I want to thank the Dewey Foundation and the Pacific Division of the APA 
for the honor of inviting me to give this lecture. I am asked to reflect 
upon my life, and to give you a fragment of the story of philosophy in 
the same period as seen through the eyes of just one participant in that 
story. I think that philosophers are generally more interested in ideas 
than in people, and that is as it should be, so you are showing special 
generosity in coming here today to hear about my personal viewpoint 
and the events that shaped it, and I am very grateful to you.
I was one of a multitude of babies born at the leading edge of the baby 
boom in 1946. It was a joyous time. World War II had just ended, and 
hundreds of thousands of servicemen and their brides came to California 
to make their homes. The huge increase in population occurred with 
such rapidity that many people had nowhere to live and multiple families 
were living together. At first my parents lived in a garage behind my 
father’s aunt and uncle’s home in Inglewood. But by 1947 Henry J. Kaiser 
had turned his enormous entrepreneurial talents from shipbuilding to 
developing real estate, and inexpensive tract homes were put up almost 
overnight in the San Fernando Valley. My parents bought one in North 
Hollywood, an area that was quickly converted from fertile farmland to 
residential suburbs. Everyone was approximately the same age, and 
almost all the men had recently been discharged from the military. 
Most of the mothers stayed at home with the children, who were also 
about the same age. My sister, Rita, and I had playmates for our entire 
childhood just two doors down the street. Until I entered high school, 
my life was almost entirely confined to a radius of hardly more than 
two blocks from our house. The homes of our friends, our church, our 
school, a dime store and small grocery—all were within short walking 
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distance. We hardly ever went on a trip, and I never left California until I 
went to study in France when I was twenty.
There was one division that was important among the people in our 
neighborhood. Some were Protestant and some were Catholic. As 
Catholics we were in the religious minority, and I was very conscious 
of being separated by faith from some of my close friends. Jews from 
New York gradually moved onto our street, and I began to realize that we 
tend to define ourselves by our differences, not by our similarities, even 
when the similarities are far greater than the differences. I think now 
that we could say the same thing about any two human beings in the 
world, but then I was just disturbed that I could be divided from friends 
and neighbors by some of our most important beliefs and values. But 
to some degree the sense that we were different from the majority was 
encouraged by my parents and teachers. As children, we were told that 
we had higher moral standards than the children in public schools, and 
our liturgies and feast day processions were for me a source of personal 
joy.
The Catholic community grew rapidly with the population. My parents 
used to talk about going to Mass in a tent when our parish was founded, 
but by the time I started first grade, we not only had a church, but also 
a parish school, with sixty-five children in my first grade class, taught 
by a beloved nun whom I later realized could not have been out of her 
teens. I attended St. Jane Frances Elementary school for eight years. I 
absolutely loved school, but another thing I now realize is that practically 
the only time I was taught anything directly was in religion class. Just 
about everything else I taught myself. The teachers had to devote much 
of class time to direct instruction of the slower learners, so those of 
us who could figure it out on our own were allowed to do so. I really 
don’t think I suffered from this educational strategy at all. I absorbed the 
most important things from the ethos of the school, which emphasized 
discipline, self-control, respect for others, and the belief that every 
human being is sacred. Many of these lessons were intertwined with 
religious models whose stories were captivating to my imagination. 
So virtue terms were part of my early upbringing, and of course it was 
decades before I discovered that in secular philosophical ethics, virtue 
theory had been in decline for hundreds of years.
There was one dramatic event in my childhood that no doubt shaped me 
in ways that may be obvious to people who know me well. When I was 
seven years old I was diagnosed with a severe case of rheumatic fever. 
The doctor was extremely conservative in his treatment, probably more 
than necessary. I had to stay in bed without getting up for three months. 
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During that time I had to lie flat without moving for two hours in the 
morning and two hours in the afternoon. Gradually, the lying-flat time 
was lessened, and after a few months I was allowed to get out of bed 
for an hour or two at a time to play with my sister. It was nine months 
before I was allowed to go about a normal life although, by then, in a 
weakened condition. Living a life in bed, and several hours a day lying 
flat led me to do the only thing a person in that condition can do, which 
was to live a life of thought and imagination. When I recovered, I had no 
heart damage, and I also had lots of practice in the contemplative life.
My high school was a small Catholic girls’ school in Burbank across the 
street from the Walt Disney Studios. I have many happy memories of that 
school, but one memory is directly related to contemporary religious 
epistemology. At the beginning of my ninth grade religion class, the 
teacher announced, “Young ladies, you are now old enough to have a 
more mature faith. It is not enough to believe what you were taught 
when you were younger. You need to know the reasons for your beliefs.” 
By Christmas we had studied the Cosmological argument in the form of 
Aquinas’ Second Way and Aquinas on the divine attributes, and I took 
my first philosophy essay exam. The teacher was delighted with my 
written work and the continuous stream of objections I gave to her every 
argument in class, and throughout my high school years she persisted 
with the idea that I should go into philosophy. This puzzled me because 
by my senior year I had fallen in love with physics. I thought she did not 
know me very well.
It is interesting to compare what I was told at fourteen with Alvin 
Plantinga’s well-known example of the fourteen-year-old theist who 
believes in God without evidence. By the early eighties, Plantinga 
was leading a revolution in Christian philosophy that took direct 
aim at the epistemological assumptions almost universally shared 
among philosophers of the day, and which many had used to attack 
the intellectual respectability of theism; in particular, the assumption 
that we have an intellectual obligation to base each of our beliefs on 
propositional evidence. Plantinga counters with the following:
What about the 14-year-old theist brought up to believe 
in God in a community where everyone believes? This 
14-year old theist, we may suppose, does not believe in 
God on the basis of evidence. He has never heard of the 
cosmological, teleological, or ontological arguments; in 
fact no one has ever presented him with any evidence 
at all. And although he has often been told about God, 
he does not take that testimony as evidence; he does 
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not reason thus: everyone around here says God loves 
us and cares for us; most of what everyone around here 
says is true; so probably that is true. Instead, he simply 
believes what he is taught. Is he violating an all-things-
considered intellectual duty? Surely not.1
I do not deny what Plantinga says here at all, and I will be forever grateful 
to him and other Reformed epistemologists like Nicholas Wolterstorff 
and George Mavrodes for their courage and success in showing the 
flimsiness of the project of evidentialism that had put religious believers 
on the defensive. But there is a difference between Catholic and Calvinist 
philosophers in our approaches to the relation between faith and reason, 
and the extent to which we can trust our rational faculties. I was already 
aware of the impressive Catholic intellectual tradition before high school, 
but in ninth grade it was presented to me as a centuries-long communal 
project of investigating the origin and constitution of the world, and I 
got to engage in it myself. One argument or twenty arguments is not 
the end of it, and all of the arguments together do not add up to belief 
in the most important matters such as belief in God. And we could say 
the same thing about beliefs important to non-theists, such as belief in 
democracy, or belief in the fundamental equality of human beings. Does 
anybody really think that they can give an argument for human equality 
that meets the severe standards of the evidentialists? But at the same 
time, does anybody think we should not exercise our minds? I don’t think 
it is a question of duty, but of a kind of intellectual integrity. Plantinga is 
right that a fourteen-year-old who believes what she is taught is doing 
nothing wrong. But it would be better if she were taught to apply her 
reasoning faculties to religious subjects, using the best examples of 
religious minds of the past as her models. When I was studying the 
history of philosophy in college, the great Christian thinkers of the long 
medieval period were required reading for majors, but when I got to 
graduate school, I discovered that Ph.D. students were not expected to 
study anything between Aristotle and Descartes, thereby skipping the 
high era of Christian philosophy entirely.
So my introduction to philosophy in ninth grade was through a tradition 
that got virtually no attention from philosophers through most of my 
professional life. In losing an understanding of one of the world’s great 
intellectual traditions, we lost a sense of continuity with our philosophical 
past, and we inherited a distorted view of that period, with little 
understanding of how medieval scholasticism led to the birth of modern 
science, or how the Christian idea of human dignity led to the eventual 
triumph of dignity as the ground for basic human rights. In philosophy, 
we sometimes reinvent something that pre-modern philosophers did 
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especially well, such as Ockham’s treatment of the necessity of the past, 
or Molina’s treatment of counterfactual conditionals, just to take two 
examples I have used in my own work. The loss is both intellectual and 
cultural. I think that there are signs that that is changing, partly because 
of the work of a few brilliant writers on medieval figures,2 and probably 
also because the global political climate forces us to attend to the 
Arabic thinkers of the past, and they were part of the same philosophical 
culture as Western medieval philosophers.
Looking back on my experience at my high school, I think that it was 
an advantage that there were no boys and that we wore uniforms. I did 
not have to waste a lot of time fussing with clothes and makeup in the 
morning and trying to get the attention of the right boy in class, ignoring 
most of the class lecture. I was lucky to have a boyfriend, and maybe I 
would have felt differently if I hadn’t been able to go out so much. But 
at least in that era, male presence in the classroom made it less likely 
that female students would participate in class discussion, and female 
teachers favored male over female students, a tendency that annoyed 
my mother immensely. My mother was not educated beyond high school 
and she had never heard the word “feminist,” but she was a natural 
feminist. She gave me the message that I could do anything I wanted in 
life, and should have an independent income so that I would never have 
to be subservient to any man. My father never mentioned the part about 
subservience but was strongly in favor of my pursuing a career as far as 
I could. One of the ironies of my halfway feminist upbringing was that 
since everyone assumed that I would marry a man who would support 
the family, it did not matter how much money I made. So I could follow 
my heart’s desire.
In the early sixties my father, Walter Trinkaus, became co-founder and 
first president of the Southern California Right to Life League, one of 
the nation’s first pro-life organizations, and he formulated some of the 
earliest constitutional arguments against abortion, testifying before 
the state legislature and speaking all over the state and on national 
television at the time that California was debating the liberalization 
of abortion laws. My father’s work is discussed in Daniel K. Williams’ 
new book, Defenders of the Unborn, which overturns the conventional 
view of the pro-life movement in its beginnings.3 Before Roe v. Wade, 
the leaders were New Deal Democrats like my Dad, who saw abortion 
as a human rights issue, and only later did it become connected with 
conservative politics. In the late sixties, my father told us that someone 
he knew was surprised that he was both against the Vietnam War and 
against abortion. I grew up understanding how those two positions are 
connected.
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No one from my school had ever been accepted to Stanford. To my 
astonishment and the great glee of my father, I was admitted, and 
enthusiastically threw myself into life on that gorgeous campus. I 
became a lifelong friend of my roommate, who is here today, and I had 
a great social life since there were more than two male students for 
every female in my class, but the academic life was just as wonderful. 
The course offerings were dazzling in their range and abundance, 
including fields of knowledge I didn’t even know existed. There were no 
firm divisions among the levels of courses, and with some exceptions, 
anybody could take any class. The first quarter of my freshman year I 
chose as my elective Chinese philosophy, taught by the eminent scholar 
David Nivison. At least half of the students in the class were graduate 
students, and most of the rest were philosophy majors. The truth is 
that I was out of my depth, but it didn’t bother me because it was so 
fascinating. I got a B+, and I imagine that that was a gift. Perhaps I would 
have absorbed more if I had taken the course a few years later, but I 
still think of my early introduction to Chinese philosophy as a formative 
philosophical experience.
I intended to major in physics, but found myself unprepared for the 
fast track in math. I considered anthropology and history, but it wasn’t 
until my junior year that I decided that philosophy was the only field 
that would hold my interest for the rest of my life. By that time I had 
discovered phenomenology when I took a course from Dagfinn Follesdal, 
but when I entered the Ph.D. program at Berkeley, phenomenology 
was soon left behind because I liked everything. I recall a remark Keith 
Donnellan made a long time ago. He said that when people really love 
some genre, they even enjoy the inferior examples of it. So movie buffs 
enjoy B movies. Philosophy buffs enjoy B philosophy articles. I was one 
of those. I am sorry to say that I gradually lost my delight in bad as well 
as in good philosophy, but I am happy to see that level of enthusiasm in 
many of my students.
During my year at Berkeley, I met and married Ken Zagzebski, who had 
just graduated from the Air Force Academy and was pursuing a master’s 
degree in civil engineering. It was the most violent year in Berkeley’s 
history. We joined some Vietnam war protests, but there were other 
rallies and marches, culminating in the student takeover of People’s 
Park, which brought in the National Guard. The latter devastated me. I 
had always trusted the basic good will of people in authority in spite of 
political and moral disagreements. I saw firsthand that it is possible for 
those entrusted with protecting the common good to treat their own 
citizens, even their own children, as the enemy. Black Americans had 
experienced that for some time, of course, but what was new in that era 
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was the radicalization of white, middle class university students. I find it 
revealing to think about the fact that the entire American professoriate 
of my generation has had experiences like that, with a lingering sense of 
betrayal by authority. Their emotional reaction is sometimes generalized 
to a sense of betrayal by political and economic systems they had 
previously trusted. I think that experiences of disillusionment, alienation, 
or betrayal can be found in many segments of American society up 
to the present, and I think it can create a cultural divide that makes 
it almost impossible for each side to understand the other because 
certain experiences create an emotional wall. I see something like that 
now in my right-wing neighbors in Oklahoma, who feel betrayed by the 
leadership of both political parties, and who are driving the political 
establishment to distraction.
We attended UC Berkeley only a year and a quarter because Ken 
finished his master’s degree and was assigned to an air base in San 
Bernardino. I transferred to the Ph.D. program at UCLA and commuted 
an hour and a half each way from Riverside, getting a ride on the inter-
library loan vehicle. What was most exciting in philosophy at UCLA in the 
seventies was the theory of direct reference, which eventually produced 
a revolution in semantics and philosophy of mind. I gulped up seminars 
with Keith Donnellan, Tyler Burge, David Kaplan, and Saul Kripke, who 
visited in the later seventies. Bob and Marilyn Adams came in the early 
seventies, but I had already made up my mind to work in philosophy of 
language, and although they later became great friends, I never took a 
class from either one of them. My switch from philosophy of language 
to philosophy of religion came later.
During the entire decade I was in graduate school at UCLA, I lived a long 
way from campus, and I regret not being part of a tight, supportive, 
graduate student community like my students have. I was almost 
entirely on my own, but that was partly by choice because after our twin 
sons, Walter and Sander, were born in 1972, I spent most of my time 
mothering and engaging in community and church activities with other 
young, educated women, and I found all of that extremely rewarding. I 
had a teaching assistantship and taught part-time at local colleges, but 
I didn’t finish my Ph.D. until the end of 1979 when I was 33. I should 
not have taken so long to get my degree, but actually it was not much 
longer than the average time at UCLA in those days. To make it worse, 
after that I didn’t publish anything for five years because I thought that 
if David Kaplan, Keith Donnellan, and Rogers Albritton rarely published, 
how could I have the audacity to think that I could? Tyler Burge was 
my dissertation advisor, and of course he published papers in great 
profusion, so I should have known that it could be done, but I didn’t start 
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publishing much until other people invited me to write for their book 
collections. I did make one attempt at a journal article taken from my 
dissertation and got a “revise and resubmit” from Journal of Philosophy, 
but I didn’t understand what I was supposed to do because the reviewer 
reports conflicted, so I didn’t do anything and never sent the paper 
anywhere else. I never wrote on direct reference again until I started 
using it recently in the moral theory I call exemplarism.
It was a miracle that I got a job in philosophy without moving from our 
home in Altadena. I had no idea whether I was a good philosopher, and 
since Ken had a fine job in engineering, it did not seem reasonable to 
uproot the family unless I got one of the top jobs in the country. I applied 
for a few of those and didn’t get one. But Loyola Marymount advertised 
for a tenure-track position and I applied for it. By chance there was a 
last-minute opening to teach a class in the spring semester prior to the 
full time opening, and since the chair had just received my application 
and saw that I lived in L.A., he offered me the class. That led to two 
visiting appointments before I got a full-time position there, the first 
philosopher from a high analytic department to join their department of 
philosophers mostly trained in Catholic institutions, and suspicious of 
analytic philosophy in general, and philosophy of language in particular. 
I cannot say how much I changed them, but I know that they changed 
me. But the most important thing they did for me was to hire me. If they 
hadn’t, I doubt that I would have become a professional philosopher.
At first I read the philosophical texts my LMU colleagues mentioned 
because I wanted to have conversations with them. Then I read the texts 
because I wanted to teach them. I quickly came to agree with them 
about the importance of the history of philosophy, and some of that 
reading led directly into my first book on a topic that captivated me since 
high school: the apparent incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and 
human free will. That topic is one in which contemporary writers know 
the ancient, medieval, and later scholastic literature on the topic, and 
it has led to the sophisticated responses that continue to be published 
today. I would like to return to that topic in a future work, but only if I 
can make it far simpler than my first book. The Dilemma of Freedom and 
Foreknowledge is too complicated.
While I was working on that book, I presented a paper for the first time 
at a meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers at Notre Dame, 
and the room was full. After the talk, the session chair asked me if I had 
noticed that I was the only woman in the room. I had not. One month later 
I attended the conference that made me a professional philosopher. It 
was on April 14, 1984, at an NEH-sponsored conference in philosophy of 
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religion at the University of Nebraska, directed by Robert Audi. Marilyn 
Adams had recommended me as a commentator, and I gave a response 
to an extremely dense and meandering paper by James Ross on divine 
ideas and the metaphysics of modality. It was my good fortune that most 
of the major philosophers of religion in the country were in the room 
and I had everyone’s sympathy. From that day on I was a philosopher 
of religion, and I either wrote books or wrote for other people’s books. 
I have never published many journal articles. When I attended that 
conference, I was thirty-eight, which is about ten years older than the 
usual age for starting a philosophy career. Many times over the years I 
have asked myself if I have caught up yet.
I became an epistemologist because I found epistemology incredibly 
boring. When I joined the Society of Christian Philosophers in the mid-
eighties, I discovered that religious epistemology dominated philosophy 
of religion. I didn’t usually read epistemology papers by choice, but I 
listened to lots of conference papers on the topics that epistemologists in 
that era found gripping: foundationalism versus coherentism, internalism 
versus externalism about justification, responses to arguments for 
skepticism, and the interminable attempt to avoid Gettier problems. 
These discussions are perfectly coherent if you look at the long history 
leading up to them, but as one coming at the field from the outside, I 
thought that problems of the nature of knowledge and justification and 
the right way to govern our intellectual lives could be approached from 
a different and more fruitful standpoint. Ernie Sosa had brought up the 
idea of an intellectual virtue in his important paper, “The Raft and the 
Pyramid,” proposing that it could be used as a way to bypass the dispute 
between foundationalism and coherentism.4 Sosa’s idea then was that 
an intellectual virtue is a reliable belief-forming faculty, so his view was 
a form of reliabilism. But it occurred to me that intellectual virtue is the 
key to an entirely different approach to epistemology. I found it striking 
that the idea of a justified belief functions in epistemic evaluation the 
same way the idea of a right act functions in moral evaluation. So the 
main rivals in epistemology were analogues of the main rivals in moral 
theory before the renaissance in virtue ethics. Reliabilism with its focus 
on consequences was modeled on consequentialism, and deontological 
epistemology with its emphasis on epistemic duty was modeled on 
deontological ethics. Since I thought that virtue ethics was the most 
promising type of moral theory, I decided to write a book in which a 
theory of virtue was developed sufficiently to encompass intellectual 
virtues like open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and carefulness, 
and to generate an account of justified belief and knowledge within a 
virtue framework. 
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My wider aim was to bring epistemology and ethics closer together, 
and I think we see that in what my colleague Wayne Riggs calls the 
“value turn” in epistemology, reflected both in the stream of work on 
intellectual virtues, and in work on epistemic value. In my own writing I 
proposed what I called “the value problem” in a 1998 paper.5 This is the 
issue of what makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief. 
Traditionally, knowledge has been regarded as a state good enough to 
make it worthwhile to apply considerable effort to get it, and it is doubtful 
that it would have enjoyed so much attention from philosophers were 
it not for the assumption that the value of knowing some proposition p 
is greater than the value of merely believing truly that p. But I argued 
that a number of well-known theories of the time had trouble explaining 
why that is so. In any case, there was a vast demoting of the value of 
knowledge from its original pinnacle of a superbly valuable state. In 
fact, one of the most interesting features of the treatment of knowledge 
in Western history is that for some of the great philosophers of the past, 
a special type of knowledge is the highest human good. We see that 
view in many philosophers, but I will mention just three of the greatest. 
In Plato, Socrates say in his speech in the Symposium (206a) that love 
is the desire for the perpetual possession of beauty, and possession is 
a cognitive act—the apprehension of the eternal Forms. In Aquinas, the 
ultimate human end is happiness, which is a state in which the will is 
satiated. The will wills to possess all of reality, and that can be achieved 
in the Beatific Vision of God. So the will is satisfied in an intellectual state 
(ST I-II q. 1-5). In Spinoza also, the culmination of the human endeavor 
is an intellectual state. The highest of his three levels of knowledge 
is scientia intuitiva, a state in which a person grasps each thing in the 
universe in the context of an infinite explanatory system (Ethics IIP40s2). 
Compare that with the view that knowledge is a state of believing a true 
proposition in a justified way or as the result of the functioning of a 
reliable faculty such as the faculties of perception or memory.
Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva is a form of another epistemic good that was 
neglected for many hundreds of years—the state of understanding. 
In my early work I gave a plea for the recovery of understanding as 
a topic for epistemological investigation.6 My idea was that epistemic 
values always function as the backdrop of debates in epistemology. 
In eras of philosophical history dominated by the value of certainty, 
the threat of skepticism is a central focus of attention. In contrast, the 
more optimistic eras of epistemological history have been dominated 
by the value of understanding, and skepticism was not perceived as a 
serious threat. We have not fully recovered from the age of suspicion 
and the perennial desire to refute skepticism, but the emergence of 
reliabilism as a major player on the epistemological stage was a sign 
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of an incipient optimism about the human epistemic condition,7 and 
that optimism continues to grow with virtue epistemology. Recently, 
understanding and wisdom have been getting considerable attention 
from psychologists and theologians, as well as from philosophers, and I 
know of some fascinating interdisciplinary projects on both topics.8
Virtues of the Mind ventured into the link between ethics and 
epistemology, arguing that neither field was paying attention to 
intellectual virtue. When I wrote Epistemic Authority a few years ago, I 
ventured into the link between epistemology and political philosophy, 
arguing that neither field was paying attention to epistemic authority. 
Moral and political philosophers focused on authority over actions, 
presumably assuming that authority in the domain of belief is the 
business of the epistemologists. But epistemologists were not discussing 
authority either. If they occasionally mentioned an “epistemic authority,” 
they meant an expert. Hardly anyone except Ben McMyler suggested 
that someone could have the normative power intrinsic to authority in 
the domain of belief.9 My purpose in that book is to show that even if we 
use a modern methodology focused on the self, we get the conclusion 
that we ought to take certain persons and communities as epistemic 
authorities. This traditional conclusion does not violate our autonomy 
and, in fact, is a rational requirement of self-governance. People who 
accept traditional religious authorities such as the Catholic Church can 
be following a dictate of autonomy.
I think that my discovery is interesting because contemporary defenders 
of autonomy and traditional defenders of religious authority generally 
assume that they have so little in common as to make it hopeless to 
attempt a dialogue on the defensibility of any kind of authority. They 
agree about nothing except that modernity has hopelessly divided 
them. I think they are mistaken. Under the assumption of the modern 
value of autonomy, traditional forms of authority can be defended. If 
adherents of autonomy have objections to religious or moral authority, 
it cannot be on the grounds that such authority conflicts with autonomy.
Epistemology became a core area of philosophy because of Descartes, 
and clearly, Descartes created a methodology of philosophy that starts 
with epistemology. I have devoted most of my work in epistemology to 
arguing that the real importance of the field lies elsewhere, in its study 
of critical components of a good human life. Epistemology connects 
with moral philosophy because we cannot separate the conditions for 
believing well from the conditions for living well, and I have already 
mentioned that some of the most important philosophers of the past 
thought that our ultimate good is a state of intellect. Epistemology 
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connects with political philosophy because rules for proper governance 
and acceptance of authority extend to the domain of belief. Epistemology 
connects with metaphysics because the nature of the objects of 
knowledge affects the way we go about getting knowledge of those 
objects. As Aristotle says, although knowledge of eternal things is 
excellent beyond compare, it is more difficult to achieve than sense 
knowledge, and we cannot expect to achieve it in the same way as 
knowledge of the physical world (Parts of Animals 644b21-645a5). The 
difference between knowing the divine and knowing the ordinary world 
is an important issue in religious epistemology, and I am happy to see 
that it has been getting greater attention in recent decades.
After I wrote Virtues of the Mind, I turned to virtue ethics in a new 
style, focusing directly on persons. I first devised a Christian form of 
the theory that I called Divine Motivation Theory in a book published in 
2004. The idea is to define basic moral concepts like good person, right 
act, good motive, and good end by direct reference to persons who 
attract us because of their exemplary goodness. The theory makes God 
the ultimate foundation of morality. I said at the beginning of that book 
that I think there are two very different sensibilities that are expressed in 
moral discourse and even entire theories. One is the idea that morality 
attracts. The other is the idea that morality compels. The former focuses 
on value and virtue. The latter focuses on obligation. The former is 
optimistic enough to think that human beings are drawn to morality by 
nature and the good. The latter is pessimistic enough to think that only 
obligation, which is to say, force, can be the source of morality. The 
focus on obligation has triumphed in the modern world, and its greatest 
achievement is the global acceptance of a list of basic human rights, 
demonstrating that we can get cross-cultural agreement about minimal 
morality. This historic achievement has gone a long way towards getting 
international attention on some of the worst human abuses. But an 
unintended byproduct is that the focus on what we can demand from 
each other turns morality into a battle.
In my current book project, Exemplarist Moral Theory,10 I have gone back 
to the idea of basing an ethical theory on direct reference to exemplary 
persons, but I have made admiration the driving force of the theory. In 
recent years there has been a great deal of interest in exemplar research 
in psychology and in educational theory, including research on the 
neuroscience of exemplars. I find these studies and other studies on 
moral emotions and virtue some of the most interesting interdisciplinary 
research I have ever seen.11 In my new book, I am integrating some of 
that research along with narratives of exemplars into the body of the 
theory. There is a wave of academic interest in the positive sensibilities 
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that underlie morality, and it is very gratifying to be contributing to that 
movement. For too long philosophers and other scholars have focused 
on the negative. That skews human experience by reinforcing emotions 
like anger and resentment and ignoring emotions like admiration, awe, 
gratitude, hope, and trust. I know of numerous projects on the science 
of virtue, on hope and optimism, on humility, on gratitude, on awe and 
wonder, on the self and motivation, on happiness, a new project on moral 
exemplars called “moral beacons,” a new one on intellectual humility in 
civic life, as well as centers for the study of virtue and happiness, such 
as the Jubilee Center in England, and our new Institute for the Study 
of Human Flourishing at my campus in Oklahoma, which has partner 
centers in fourteen countries.12
These programs are not only producing high level published work in 
philosophy, psychology, and other fields, but their work is starting to 
get attention from the general educated public. I think that one of the 
most serious problems of professional philosophy is the lack of a public 
face. It is very hard to even make the topics of most journal articles 
understandable to the ordinary person, much less the content. But as 
philosophers explore more positive topics, the relevance of philosophical 
thought to issues in the public sphere has become apparent. People are 
becoming increasingly aware that philosophy has something creative 
and constructive to add to public discussions. Philosophers are not just 
the voice of sharp-edged criticism. We have in our collective memory 
the insights of great philosophical traditions, and because of the greater 
attention to Asian philosophy, that includes the impressive contributions 
of Confucianism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. I think there is a real hunger 
for this among people who look to philosophy to help them think through 
the big ideas, and we even see it in institutions like the U.S. Army, which 
has engaged philosophers to be involved with moral research.13 These 
are ways in which philosophers can make a difference to the country 
outside of the standard academic platforms.
Another example of public engagement by philosophers is in primary 
and secondary education, and in the education of physicians and 
engineers,14 where I know of programs in which philosophers have been 
involved in the design of curricula for character development in a way 
that can be empirically assessed, and I am personally acquainted with a 
charter middle school in Long Beach started by Jason Baehr, focused on 
the intellectual virtues. A generation ago, there was very little organized 
contact between professional philosophers and the institutions of 
American life, but that is changing. I think that philosophers are particularly 
well placed to revitalize the humanities by showing its potential to 
become much more than a cultural battleground. The humanities have 
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produced works of luminous beauty and ideas that are both challenging 
and inspirational. The challenges have sometimes been overwhelming, 
but my hope is that inspiration can match the challenges. Philosophy 
bears witness to the most important things that bring us together, not 
only the things that drive us apart. I think that now it is more important 
than ever to find ways to bring us together.
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